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It is more important than ever to find effective ways to encourage workers to set aside 
money for retirement. This is due to the recent increase in defined contribution pension plans in 
the United States and simultaneous decline in defined benefit pension plans. Since they are now 
responsible for their own long-term financial well-being, and since savings rates are quite low, 
Americans must begin saving at a dramatically higher rate; if they do not, millions will not have 
enough resources to support themselves in retirement (Munnell, Webb and Golub-Sass, 2012).  
One major psychological obstacle to increasing savings rates is present bias, or the tendency to 
dramatically overweight immediate utility relative to future utility. In light of present bias, 
making short-term sacrifices like spending less to produce long-term benefits like a comfortable 
retirement is a major challenge for many individuals (Angeletos et al., 2001; Benartzi, Peleg, 
Thaler, 2012).  In this paper, we rely on a field experiment to test the efficacy of two novel 
interventions designed to tackle present bias as an obstacle to increasing retirement savings rates. 
A large and influential literature suggests that choosing for later (as opposed to now) 
reduces present bias, making it more likely that we will do what is in our long-term best interest 
(see Milkman, Rogers and Bazerman, 2008 for a review).  For example, making choices that will 
take effect in the future rather than now leads people to select healthier foods (Read and Van 
Leeuwen, 1998; Milkman, Rogers and Bazerman, 2010) and more educational films (Read, 
Loewenstein and Kalyanaraman, 1999; Milkman, Rogers and Bazerman, 2009), donate more to 
charity (Rogers and Bazerman, 2008; Breman, 2011), and discount future cash flows less steeply 
(Ainslie and Handel, 1983).  In the domain of retirement savings, the benefits of choosing in 
advance have not been explicitly tested, but one influential field study of a program called “Save 
More Tomorrow” (SMarT) revealed that people save dramatically more for retirement when 
offered the opportunity to commit to diverting a subset of the proceeds of their future pay raises 
to a retirement savings account (Benartzi and Thaler, 2004).  SMarT’s success has been 
attributed to two sources.  First, SMarT allows people to start saving later rather than now, and as 
described above, choosing for later typically leads us to do what is in our long-term best interest 
(e.g., saving) at a higher rate. Second, SMarT prevents savers from experiencing a decrease in 
their take-home pay, since the program only takes savings out of raises; this may contribute to its 
appeal because people find losses from a current reference point (like a reference paycheck) 
extremely aversive (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Importantly, however, the benefits of 
SMarT have not been tested experimentally, nor have scholars confirmed the presumed sources 
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of the program’s effectiveness.  One goal of this paper is to isolate the effect of offering 
individuals an opportunity to begin saving later. A second goal is to evaluate what proposed time 
delay for increasing saving produces the highest net retirement savings contribution rates.   
A third goal of this paper also relates to temporal effects on retirement savings, namely, 
the open question of whether delayed savings can be made yet more attractive by leveraging 
cyclical declines in present bias. Research on “the fresh start effect” suggests that there are 
certain, recurring points in time when we are particularly motivated to engage in future-oriented 
behaviors, or in other words, when we are less present-biased.  Specifically, we make more 
future-oriented choices following “temporal landmarks” (Dai, Milkman and Riis, in press; 2014), 
or dates such as birthdays and holidays that segment our continuous lifetimes by “stand[ing] in 
marked contrast to the seemingly unending stream of trivial and ordinary occurrences that 
happen to us everyday” (Shum 1998, p. 423).  Recent studies have shown that people search 
more for the term “diet” on Google, visit the gym more frequently, and create more health-
related and health-irrelevant goals following temporal landmarks (Dai, Milkman and Riis, in 
press).  Temporal landmarks that stand between us and a future date make that future date feel 
more distant (Tu and Soman, 2013). Further, when they arise, temporal landmarks segregate us 
from our past failures, creating the perception that the “old me” failed, but the “new me” has a 
clean slate and is thus more capable of taking difficult but beneficial future-oriented actions (Dai, 
Milkman and Riis, 2014).  Merely reminding someone about an upcoming temporal landmark in 
the laboratory (e.g., that March 20th is the first day of spring) increases that individual’s interest 
in pursuing future-oriented behaviors (i.e., goal pursuit) following the upcoming date in question.  
In this paper, we explore whether offering people the opportunity to begin saving after a future 
date that is highlighted as a temporal landmark (e.g., “following your next birthday”; “following 
New Year’s”) may increase retirement savings contributions over and above simply offering the 
opportunity to delay savings increases by an equivalent amount.  
In order to (1) test whether people save more for retirement when given the option to put 
off savings increases until the future, (2) evaluate the ideal time delay to offer, and (3) examine 
the benefits of framing the chance to delay as an opportunity to start saving after a temporal 
landmark, we conducted a between-subjects field experiment with a sample of 8,251 employees 
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of four major U.S. universities.1  We studied employees’ retirement savings contribution rates for 
nine months following their receipt of a mailing encouraging them to either enroll in a retirement 
savings plan or increase their monthly contributions to an existing retirement savings plan.  The 
mailings allowed employees to enroll in a retirement savings plan at a default savings rate in a 
default investment vehicle (or increase their contribution rate in an existing investment up to a 
default quantity) by returning a signed, pre-stamped, pre-addressed postcard with a box checked 
indicating that they wanted to begin saving now (or later, in some experimental conditions).  Past 
research has shown that such simplified enrollment and escalation mailings are an effective 
means of increasing retirement savings rates (Beshears et al., 2013). We randomly assigned 
participants to receive mailings that invited them to begin saving more (a) now (no delay 
condition), (b) now or later (standard delay), or (c) now or after a temporal landmark (e.g., after 
their next birthday, after New Year’s; framed delay).  We also experimentally varied the time 
delay offered in the delay conditions, which ranged from two months to six months.  We 
predicted that we would observe the largest net increase in employees’ retirement contributions 
over the nine month period following our mailing in the framed delay condition, followed by the 
standard delay condition, with employees in the no delay condition contributing the least to their 
retirement savings plan.  
2. Field Experiment: How Delayed Options Affect Retirement Savings 
2.1. Experimental Methods 
The four U.S. universities involved in our field experiment first identified a retirement 
savings plan to which they would like to increase employees’ contributions (hereafter referred to 
as the targeted plan). In all universities, mailings were sent out to employees who were not 
enrolled in the targeted plan and had a contribution rate of zero. In one university (hereafter 
referred to as School D), mailings were also sent out to employees who had a positive 
contribution rate but were not contributing at the level necessary to obtain the full employer 
match. One of the retirement plan record keepers for these universities sent out mailings in early 
October 2013 to university employees’ homes. The mailings provided employees with an 
                                                
1 We originally included a fifth university in the experiment.  However, this university offers generous employer 
contributions that are not contingent on employee contributions, and it requires employees to elect dollar 
contribution amounts instead of contribution rates.  As a result, the mailings used for this university required a 
different design, and response rates to the mailings at this university were extremely low, making it impossible to 
perform a meaningful analysis of the effect of different experimental treatments.  We therefore drop this university 
from our analysis. 
 4 
opportunity to either begin saving (for those not enrolled) or increase their savings contributions 
(for those enrolled but saving at a low rate) by filling out and mailing back a simple form.  
Randomization was stratified at the birth month level, and employees were randomized 
into three primary conditions: the no delay condition, the standard delay condition, and the 
framed delay condition. Employees assigned to the no delay condition were encouraged to sign 
up to save (or to save more) immediately. Those assigned to the standard delay condition were 
given the opportunity to sign up to save (or to save more) either immediately or after a time 
delay (e.g., “in three months”) ranging from two to six months. Finally, those in the framed delay 
condition received a mailing identical to those received by employees in the standard delay 
condition, except the time delay reference (e.g., “in three months”) was replaced by a reference 
to a temporal landmark with the same time delay (e.g., “following your next birthday,” 
“following Thanksgiving”). The temporal landmarks were either holidays (Thanksgiving, New 
Year’s, Martin Luther King Day, Valentine’s Day, and the first day of spring) or employees’ 
birthdays.  
Since delayed savings opportunities were offered in the five months following our 
experimental mailing (November 2013-March 2014), only employees whose birthday fell into 
this period could be randomized to receive a message offering them the opportunity to begin 
saving after their next birthday. Thus, prior to randomization, employees were divided into two 
sub-groups: those with birthdays between November and March (hereafter the birthday group), 
and others (hereafter the no birthday group). They were then randomized to conditions as 
illustrated in Figure 1. Specifically, those with birthdays between November and March were 
divided evenly between four experimental conditions: the no delay condition, the standard delay 
condition, and two sub-categories of the framed delay condition—the birthday-framed delay 
condition that offered employees an opportunity to begin saving following their next birthday 
and the and the holiday-framed delay condition that associated the time delay with a future 
holiday. The delay offered to employees in the birthday group was determined by their birth 
month. For instance, consider an employee whose birthday is in December. Recall that our 
mailings went out in early October. If this employee were assigned to the standard delay 
condition, she would be offered the opportunity to start saving “in three months” (or in January).  
If she were assigned to the holiday-framed delay condition, she would be offered the opportunity 
to start saving after New Year’s (or in January), since New Year’s corresponds to a three-month 
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delay. If she were assigned to the birthday-framed delay condition, she would be offered the 
opportunity to start saving after her next birthday (again, in January). 
Those with birthdays between April and October were divided evenly between the no 
delay condition, the standard delay condition, and the framed delay condition—which was 
essentially the holiday-framed delay condition. The delay offered to employees in the no 
birthday group was randomized to be from two to six months (in the standard delay condition) or 
from Thanksgiving to Spring Equinox (in the framed delay condition). For proper comparison 
across assigned groups, every employee in the framed delay condition was yoked with an 
employee in the standard delay condition who was offered the opportunity to start saving (or 
save more) at the same time delay. For example, an employee who was randomly assigned to 
have the opportunity to begin saving after New Year’s was yoked with an employee who had the 
opportunity to begin saving in three months. Notably, past research suggests that New Year’s is a 
particularly meaningful fresh start opportunity (Dai, Milkman and Riis, 2014). Thus, among 
employees in the framed delay condition, we oversampled assignment to the “after New Year’s” 
time delay. Correspondingly, we oversampled assignment to the three-month delay in the 
standard delay condition.  
To protect the anonymity of our four university partners, we will simply refer to them as 
Schools A, B, C and D.  For all schools, the targeted fund was a lifecycle fund. Lifecycle funds 
enable employees to have a diversified portfolio with a mixture of equity, bond and money 
market funds tailored to the employee’s age. The contribution rate suggested by the mailings sent 
out was 3% of the employee’s pay for all partners but School D, which had a suggested rate of 
5%. The suggested rate was 5% for School D because School D matches employees’ 
contributions dollar-for-dollar up to 5% of the employee’s base salary. Detailed information 
about the targeted plans can be found in Table 1, and information about non-targeted savings 
plans is in Appendix A. 
2.2. Data  
We analyze the data provided by four university partners. These universities pulled a 
cross-sectional snapshot of all employees in August 2013 including information about each 
employee’s: (1) current contributions to the savings plan targeted in our mailings, (2) current 
contributions to all other non-targeted savings plans, (3) birth date, (4) hire date, (5) termination 
date, (6) salary, and (7) position (indicator for faculty versus staff). We relied on information 
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from this first data pull to conduct our stratified random assignment of employees to 
experimental conditions. We then received data from our university partners including 
information on each employee’s contributions to the targeted retirement savings plan and all 
other retirement savings plans as well as their pay for each pay cycle through June 2014. 
2.3. Variables and Analysis Strategy 
To capture the effect of the different experimental treatments on savings, we use the two 
outcome variables described below and calculate these variables for both the targeted plan and 
all available plans (including the targeted and non-targeted plans) for each employee.  
Average contribution rate. For every employee, we calculate her average contribution 
rate during November 2013 through June 2014. Specifically, we calculate the total number of 
dollars the employee contributed to the targeted plan (or all plans) during November 2013 
through June 2014, divided by her total pay during November 2013 through June 2014. We 
calculate a savings rate over this time period because November 2013 is the first month during 
which contribution rate increases triggered by responses to our mailing were implemented, while 
June 2014 is the latest month for which we have data on contributions and pay. 
Higher contribution indicator. For every employee, we construct a variable indicating 
whether or not the employee’s May 2014 contribution rate to the targeted plan (or all plans) is 
higher than the employee’s September 2013 contribution rate to the targeted plan (or all plans). 
We choose September 2013 and May 2014 as the two relevant months because the mailings were 
sent in October 2013 and because April 2014 was the last month during which contribution rate 
increases triggered by responses to the mailing were implemented. Thus, comparing September 
2013 to May 2014 captures all contribution rate increases that could have been the direct result 
of our mailing. 
We use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to predict our outcome variables, 
average contribution rate and higher contribution indicator. We first rely on the following 
regression specification to test the differences in average contribution rate between the no delay, 
standard delay, and framed delay conditions:  
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒! = 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑑  𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦  𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟! + 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦  𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟! + 𝑋! + 𝜀!  
(1) 
where i indexes an employee. The first predictor variable, the framed delay indicator, 
indicates whether or not a given employee received a mailing offering a delayed option that was 
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associated with a temporal landmark (either a holiday or the employee’s next birthday). This 
variable takes a value of one for employees in the framed delay condition and zero for employees 
in any of other conditions. Our second predictor variable, the delay indicator, indicates whether 
or not a given employee received a mailing offering any form of time delay option. This variable 
takes a value of one for both employees in the standard delay condition and those in the framed 
delay condition. Altogether, the coefficient on the framed delay indicator reflects the difference 
in average contribution rates between the standard delay and framed delay conditions, whereas 
the coefficient on the delay indicator reflects the difference in average contribution rates between 
the standard delay and no delay conditions. 𝑋! is a vector of controls, including gender, age 
decile, tenure decile, salary decile, faculty status, and birth month. We allow the coefficients on 
the control variables to vary by university and calculate decile breakpoints separately for each 
university.2 We report robust standard errors (𝜀!). 
 We conduct further analysis to understand whether it is more effective to associate a 
time delay with a future holiday or with an employee’s next birthday. As described earlier in the 
Methods section, employees in the birthday group with November-March birth months were 
randomly assigned to four groups: the no delay group, the standard delay group, the birthday-
framed delay group, and the holiday-framed delay group. Employees in the no birthday group 
with April-October birth months were randomly assigned to eleven different groups: the no delay 
group, standard delays of 2-6 months (i.e., five sub-groups of the standard delay condition), and 
holiday-framed delays of 2-6 months (i.e., five sub-groups of the framed delay condition). As a 
result, we can only compare the effect of birthday framing with the effect of holiday framing 
among employees in the birthday group. Consequently, we use the following regression 
specification to separately estimate the effects of different framings and delays for employees 
with November-March birth months versus those with April-October birth months: 
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒! =
(𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑎𝑦_𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑑  𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦  𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟! +   ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑦_𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑑  𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦  𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟! +
𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦  𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟!)+
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠  𝑜𝑓  𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦  𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑛𝑜  𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑎𝑦  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝! + 𝑋! + 𝜀!                    
(2) 
                                                
2 As explained earlier, School D sent mailings to employees who were not enrolled in the targeted plan as well as 
employees who were not contributing sufficiently to obtain the full employer match. We allow the coefficients on 
the control variables and decile breakpoints to differ between these two groups of employees in School D.  
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where i indexes an employee and 𝑋! is the same vector of controls included in (1). The 
first three predictor variables were used to classify employees in the birthday group based on the 
experimental group they were randomly assigned to. Specifically, the birthday-framed delay 
indicator equals one if a given employee in the birthday group received a mailing offering her 
the opportunity to begin saving after her next birthday, and equals zero otherwise. The holiday-
framed delay indicator equals one if a given employee in the birthday group received a mailing 
offering her the opportunity to begin saving after a holiday, and equals zero otherwise. The delay 
indicator equals one if a given employee in the birthday group received any of the three delay 
options (i.e., standard delay, birthday-framed delay, or holiday-framed delay), and equals zero 
otherwise. These three predictor variables allow us to compare the effects of birthday framing, 
holiday framing, and neutral framing on savings among employees in the birthday group. 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠  𝑜𝑓  𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦  𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑛𝑜  𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑎𝑦  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝!   represent a vector of 
predictor variables that classify employees in the no birthday group based on the experimental 
group they were randomly assigned to. Specifically, we include indicators for five standard delay 
groups and five holiday-framed delay groups, with the no delay group being the omitted 
reference group. These predictor variables allow us to compare the effect of offering a standard 
delay with the effect of framing the same time delay in relationship to a holiday. Also, the 
indicators for the five standard delay groups allow us to compare across different lengths of 
delays, and the indicators for the five holiday-framed delay groups allow us to compare across 
different holiday framings.3  
To examine how our interventions affect the likelihood of employees increasing their 
contribution rates from September 2013 to May 2014, we use the same regression specifications 
(1) and (2) to predict the other outcome variable, the higher contribution indicator.  
2.4. Results 
2.4.1.   Employee Characteristics across Conditions 
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of the employees in our experiment. Slightly more 
than half of the employees are female. The mean age is 43 years, and the mean tenure at the 
university is 9.5 years. The mean salary is nearly $60,000 annually, and slightly more than one in 
                                                
3 Recall that employees in the no birthday group were randomly assigned to have a delay corresponding one of the 
five lengths of delays or one of the five holidays; however, employees in the birthday group received a time delay 
that was determined by their birth month and thus was not exogenous. Therefore, we can only examine the effects of 
different lengths of delays and different holiday framings among employees in the no birthday group.  
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ten employees in the sample is a faculty member. Statistical tests comparing these characteristics 
across our three primary experimental conditions (no delay, standard delay, and framed delay) 
indicate that the conditions are balanced. The only statistically significant differences are for the 
mean salary of the no delay condition, which is less than the mean salary of the standard delay 
condition and the mean salary of the framed delay condition. The no delay condition also has a 
higher fraction of females compared to the framed delay condition, although this difference is 
only marginally statistically significant. We control for all of these characteristics in our analysis 
of treatment effects. 
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2.4.2.  The Effect of the Mail Campaign Overall 
Before studying the effect of different versions of our mailing on savings, we analyze the 
effect of the mail campaign overall. That is, we first examine whether sending people mailings 
like ours per se can increase retirement savings. Mailings were sent to employees’ homes in 
October 2013, and employees who responded to the no delay mailing had their contribution rate 
increases implemented over the course of November 2013. To capture the overall impact of the 
mailing, we examine employees who received the no delay mailing, and compare their 
contribution rates in the targeted plans in December 2013 to their contribution rates in the 
targeted plans in October 2013. We observe that slightly more than 6% of employees in the no 
delay condition had a higher contribution rate in December 2013 than in October 2013. As a 
benchmark, we study the same group of employees but compare their contribution rates in the 
targeted plans in October 2013 to their contribution rates in the targeted plans in August 2013.  
Since targeted employees were identified by each university in August 2013, increases in 
contribution rates between August 2013 and October 2013 (the time of our mailing) reflect how 
contribution rates might have changed between October 2013 and December 2013 if our mail 
campaign were not implemented. Less than 4% of employees had a higher contribution rate in 
October 2013 than in August 2013. The difference between the August-October rate of 
contribution increases and the October-December rate of contribution increases is highly 
statistically significant (p < 0.001). While we cannot rule out seasonal effects as an alternative 
explanation for this finding, the evidence suggesting that the mailing has a positive overall 
impact on savings is consistent with previous work on simplified contribution increase 
mechanisms (Beshears et al., 2013). 
2.4.2.  The Effect of Fresh Start Framing 
Table 3 reports the results from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the 
average contribution rate or the higher contribution indicator for either targeted plans or all 
plans. Model 1 shows the results from a regression predicting the average contribution rate for 
targeted plans. The positive coefficient on the framed delay indicator (p < 0.10) indicates that 
relative to the standard delay condition, the framed delay treatment marginally significantly 
increases average contribution rates for targeted plans by 10 basis points of pay. Model 2 
examines differences in average contribution rates for all plans and shows that the framed delay 
condition has (directionally) higher average contribution rates than the standard delay condition 
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(p = 0.19). In Models 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the higher contribution indicator. These 
models show that employees in the framed delay condition are more likely than employees in the 
standard delay condition to have a higher contribution rate in May 2014 relative to September 
2013, although the differences are not statistically significant for either targeted plans (p = 0.60) 
or for all plans (p =  0.43).  
To further understand what drives the positive framing effect on average contribution 
rates, we separately test the effects of birthday framing and holiday framing using regression 
specification (2) described earlier. First, we focus on employees with November-March birth 
months. The first half of Table 4 suggests that the positive effect of a framed delay on savings is 
concentrated in the birthday-framed delay group. Specifically, Model 1 shows that compared 
with the standard delay group, associating a time delay with an employee’s next birthday 
increases average contribution rates for targeted plans by 22 basis points of pay (p < 0.05). 
Model 2 suggests that the effect of birthday framing on savings becomes stronger for all plans, 
with birthday framing increasing average contribution rates for all plans by 33 basis points of 
pay (p < 0.05). Further, Models 3 and 4 indicate that the birthday-framed delay group also has a 
higher likelihood of exhibiting a higher contribution rate in May 2014 versus September 2013 
than the standard delay group (p < 0.10 for targeted plans and p < 0.05 for all plans). In terms of 
the effects of holiday framing, Models 1-4 altogether show that average contribution rates and 
the likelihood of exhibiting a higher contribution rate in May 2014 versus September 2013 are 
higher in the holiday-framed delay group than in the standard delay group, but the differences are 
not statistically significant (all p’s > 0.20).  Figure 2 displays the predicted values of our 
outcome variables (the average contribution rate and the higher contribution indicator) in each 
condition for both targeted plans and all plans among employees with November-March birth 
months. All control variables are fixed at their means.   
The second half of Table 4 compares different holidays to their corresponding standard 
delays among employees with April-October birth months. The only holiday that is remarkable is 
the spring equinox, which leads to the highest average contribution rate and the highest 
likelihood of exhibiting increased contribution rates from September 2013 to May 2014 among 
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all of the ten delay groups (including five standard delay groups and five holiday-framed delay 
groups).4 However, this finding is not predicted ex ante and likely the result of sampling noise. 
2.4.3.   The Effect of Offering a Delayed Option 
Next, we turn to examine how offering a delayed option per se without framing affects 
savings. Contrary to our hypothesis, Model 1 in Table 3 indicates that offering a standard delay, 
which does not frame the delay in terms of temporal landmarks such as holidays or birthdays, 
decreases average contribution rates for targeted plans by 14 basis points of pay (p < 0.05). 
Model 2 indicates a stronger negative effect of offering a standard delay on savings for all plans: 
average contribution rates for all plans are lower in the standard delay group than in the no delay 
group by 27 basis points of pay (p < 0.01).  
The impact of offering a delayed option on average contribution rates can be broken 
down into two different effects. First, the availability of a delayed option may cause an employee 
to agree to increase her contribution rate when that employee would not have otherwise agreed to 
such an increase. This first effect should lead to an increase in savings. Second, the availability 
of a delayed option may decrease savings by shortening the length of time during which an 
employee has a higher contribution rate. The finding that the standard delay group has lower 
savings overall than the no delay group (Models 1 and 2 in Table 3) indicates that the second 
effect dominates. However, it is theoretically possible that a longer time horizon for measuring 
average contribution rates would reverse this conclusion, as the greater number of people saving 
at a higher contribution rate eventually outweighs the temporarily low contribution rates induced 
by the delayed option. Models 3 and 4 in Table 3 where the dependent measure is the higher 
contribution indicator suggest that this possibility is unlikely. If anything, employees in the 
standard delay group are less likely than employees in the no delay group to have a higher 
contribution rate in May 2014 versus September 2013, although this effect is not statistically 
significant for targeted plans or all plans (both ps > 0.17).  
The aforementioned results with respect to the effect of offering a standard delay option 
are replicated in Table 4. Among employees with November-March birth months, offering a 
standard delay option lowers both average contribution rates and the likelihood of employees 
increasing their contribution rates from September 2013 to May 2014, although the differences 
                                                
4 Compared to its corresponding six-month standard delay, framing a six-month delay in relation to the spring 
equinox increases average contribution rates (p < 0.05 for targeted plans and p < 0.10 for all plans). 
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are not statistically significant (all p’s > 0.11). Among employees with April-October birth 
months, average contribution rates and the likelihood of exhibiting a higher contribution rate in 
May 2014 versus September 2013 are generally lower for the standard delay groups than the no 
delay group regardless of the length of delay. In fact, there is no discernible pattern related to the 
number of months of delay. 
2.4.4.  Robustness Checks 
Our results are robust to various robustness checks (e.g., using a logistic regression rather 
than an OLS model to predict the higher contribution indicator), though the statistical 
significance of a few predictor variables changes in a couple of cases. Detailed descriptions and 
regression results are reported in Appendix B. 
2.5. Discussion 
Our field experiment has two primary findings. First, it shows that relative to offering 
people the option to save more at a standard time delay (e.g., “in two months”), associating the 
time delay with a future temporal landmark—particularly with an employee’s next birthday—
can increase average contribution rates. Second, contrary to our hypothesis, offering the standard 
delay option does not lead more people to sign up to increase their savings. As a result, the 
presence of a standard delay option decreases overall retirement wealth because some people 
selected the delayed option and had a higher contribution rate for a shorter period of time. The 
negative effect of offering a standard delay option on savings seemingly contradicts the well-
established success of the SMarT program (Benartzi & Thaler, 2004) as well as past research 
showing that choosing for later (as opposed to now) increases people’s willingness to pursue 
their long-term interests (e.g., Milkman et al., 2009). As explained in the introduction, it is 
important to note that our experimental design differs in a few important aspects from (a) 
SMarT’s design and (b) the paradigm that past research has used to examine dynamic 
inconsistency. Specifically, employees in the standard delay condition of our field experiment 
were offered both the option to save more later and the option to save more now. When the 
immediate enrollment option and the delayed enrollment option were simultaneously presented, 
employees might infer that the human resources (HR) department at their university did not 
strongly recommend retirement savings because otherwise the HR department would have 
prompted them to sign up immediately by only offering the immediate enrollment option. Such 
an inference about the HR department’s recommendation may lead employees to sign up for the 
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savings program at a lower rate than they otherwise would if they were only provided with the 
immediate enrollment option. We conducted a laboratory experiment to test this possibility. 
3.  Laboratory Experiment: Recommendation Implicit in Mailings 
3.1. Method 
We recruited participants through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (an online labor market) to 
take a short survey. Participants were first asked to imagine that the human resources (HR) 
department at Company X planned to send its employees mailings about the company’s 
retirement savings program and was choosing between two messaging strategies suggested by an 
outside consultant. This laboratory experiment compared three messaging strategies. See 
Supplementary Materials for our complete study materials. 
• The no delay mailing encourages employees to sign up for Company X’s retirement savings 
plan immediately. We adapted the mailing from the mailings sent to employees in the no 
delay condition of our field experiment but replaced references to universities and their 
specific retirement savings plans with references to Company X and its hypothetical 
retirement savings program.  
• The standard delay mailing offers employees two options: the option to start contributing to 
Company X’s retirement savings program immediately and the option to start contributing in 
six months. We adapted the mailing from the mailings sent to employees in the six-month 
standard delay condition of our field experiment. 
• The make-up delay mailing consists of two stages. At Stage I, the mailing is identical to the no 
delay mailing which invites employees to enroll in Company X’s retirement savings program 
immediately. If an employee does not reply to the no delay mailing quickly, the HR 
department will go on to Stage II and send the employee a follow-up mailing that offers her 
the opportunity to enroll in the program in six months. We adapted the Stage II mailing from 
the standard delay mailing but only kept the delayed option. This messaging strategy was 
designed to resemble how the SMarT program was implemented in some cases (Benartzi & 
Thaler, 2004). 
Participants were randomly assigned to read two of the three messaging strategies. We 
used four comprehension check questions to assess participants’ understanding of (a) what 
options employees would have if Company X chose a given messaging strategy and (b) how an 
employee’s average contribution to Company X’s retirement savings plan would change in eight 
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months if he chose to enroll later (as opposed to now). The 473 participants (40% females, two 
unspecified; Mage = 33.07) who passed our comprehension check questions went on to complete 
our survey and comprised our actual study sample. Participants who failed our comprehension 
check questions exited our survey.  
Participants were asked to imagine that the HR department decided to use one of the two 
messaging strategies. Hereafter, we refer to the selected messaging strategy as the endorsed 
strategy and the unselected messaging strategy as the alternative strategy. Each participant was 
presented with one of three pairs of messaging strategies and was informed that one of the two 
strategies within the pair had been selected as the endorsed strategy. Thus, we had a 3X2 
between-subjects design with six experimental conditions. For each pair of messaging strategies, 
we counterbalanced the presentation order of the two strategies as well as whether the first or 
second strategy was endorsed. There was no order effect on our measure of interest described 
below (all p’s > 0.15). Therefore, we collapsed the data to only focus on the six between-subjects 
experimental conditions when reporting the results later.  
Our primary measure of interest is participants’ inferences about how urgently and 
strongly the HR department encourages retirement savings (adapted from McKenzie, Liersch, & 
Finkelstein, 2006). Specifically, participants were asked to rate what they thought “choosing this 
messaging strategy (rather than the other messaging strategy) says about the HR staff’s view 
about what employees should do” on a 1-5 scale (1 = Their choice tells me nothing about their 
views on what employees should do; 5 = Their choice tells me they believe it is urgent that 
employees should enroll in the retirement savings program). 
3.2. Results 
 Figure 3 plots the mean of participants’ ratings about how strongly the HR department 
encouraged retirement savings based on the endorsed strategy. First, we examine responses from 
participants who were randomly assigned to compare the no delay mailing and the standard delay 
mailing, the two version of mailings that corresponded to the no delay and standard delay 
conditions in our field experiment. We expected that compared with the no delay mailing, 
offering a delayed option in the standard delay mailing would signal that the HR department was 
not strongly encouraging the sign up for the savings program. Indeed, the company’s decision to 
use the standard delay mailing implied to participants that the HR department was less 
enthusiastically recommending retirement savings (M = 2.92, SD = 1.17), compared with the 
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company’s decision to use the no delay mailing (M = 4.05, SD = 1.12), t(169) = 6.41, p < 0.0001. 
This comparison is depicted in Panel A of Figure 3.  
 Next, we compare the standard delay mailing with the make-up delay mailing (Panel B of 
Figure 3). Though both mailing strategies involve offering a delayed option, the timing of the 
delayed option is different. The standard delay mailing—which offers a delayed option 
simultaneously with an immediate enrollment option—may be interpreted as a signal that the HR 
department was not seriously recommending increasing savings. In contrast, the make-up delay 
mailing strategy—which offers people the option to save more later in a second mailing only if 
they do not respond to the first mailing encouraging immediate enrollment—may be interpreted 
as a signal that the HR department considers retirement savings to be hugely important. Indeed, 
participants believed that enrolling in the retirement savings program was recommended by the 
HR department less zealously if the HR department chose the standard delay mailing (M = 2.86, 
SD = 1.00) than if the HR department chose the make-up delay mailing (M = 3.78, SD = 1.31), 
t(156) = 2.69, p < 0.0001.  
Last, we compare the no delay mailing with the make-up delay mailing (Panel C of 
Figure 3). Note that the two mailings are identical except that the make-up delay mailing strategy 
involves a second-stage mailing targeted at people who did not respond to the initial, no-delay 
mailing at the first stage. Thus, we expected that the make-up delay mailing should signal the HR 
department’s strong recommendation. Indeed, participants rated that the HR department was 
more enthusiastically recommending employees to enroll in the retirement savings program if the 
HR department chose the make-up delay mailing (M = 4.00, SD = 1.02) than if the HR 
department chose the no delay mailing (M = 3.49, SD = 1.18), t(142) = 2.69, p < 0.0001.5  
Conclusion 
Despite the suggestion from previous research that having the option to delay the 
implementation of a contribution rate increase leads to higher savings, our field experiment 
indicates that offering an option to delay leads to less retirement wealth accumulation.  However, 
the evidence suggests that framing the delay in relationship to a future temporal landmark, such 
                                                
5 We also collected a secondary measure that asked participants to predict which one of the two messaging strategies 
presented to them would lead to higher average contribution rates. Consistent with our speculation that 
recommendation implicit in mailings affects savings, people tended to expect that the messaging strategy which 
signaled the HR department’s stronger recommendation would result in higher total contributions than the 
messaging strategy which signaled the HR department’s weaker recommendation. See Appendix C for details about 
the measure and results. 
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as a birthday, increases savings relative to framing the delay in a neutral fashion.  Future research 
should explore techniques for taking advantage of framing related to future temporal landmarks 
without triggering the negative consequences of the availability of delayed implementation.  
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Table 1. Descriptions of Targeted Plans 
School Eligibility Employer Contribution 
A Employees on University payroll with FICA deductions 
 
None 
B Any employee whose annual contribution limit to the 
targeted plan is at least $200 
 
None 
 
 
C All paid employees and students with a stipend 
 
None 
D Eligibility for Employee Contribution 
- Regular full-time staff (monthly and weekly-paid) OR 
- Full-time faculty and academic support staff in a 
benefits-eligible title OR 
- Limited-service staff scheduled to work at least 35 
hours/week, 9 months/year (monthly and weekly-paid) 
 
Eligibility for Employer Contribution 
- Eligible employees at least 21 years of age 
- Must have at least one year of prior service 
- Dollar-for-dollar match on employee contributions up to 
5% for all ages 
 
Automatic Contribution (without employee contribution): 
- age < 30: 1.5% of salary  
- 30 - 39: 3% of salary  
- 40 or over: 4% of salary 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics by Condition 
This table summarizes key control variables used in our analyses by each experimental condition. The last three columns show the p-
values comparing the means between any two conditions.   
 
 
No Delay Standard Delay Framed Delay No Delay vs. Standard Delay 
No Delay vs. 
Framed Delay 
Standard Delay 
vs. Framed Delay 
    
p-value 
Percent Female 
        Mean 52.65% 51.85% 50.29% 0.56 0.07 0.23 
Age (years) 
        Mean 43.20 43.00 43.44 0.55 0.45 0.15 
  (Std. Dev.) (12.32) (11.77) (11.93) 
   Tenure (years) 
        Mean 9.51 9.54 9.52 0.91 0.97 0.93 
  (Std. Dev.) (9.14) (8.93) (9.05) 
   Baseline Salary ($)  
        Mean 56505.19 58505.26 59509.52 0.04 0.00 0.31 
  (Std. Dev.) (35234.21) (36111.88) (39849.63) 
   Percent Faculty 
        Mean 11.62% 12.75% 12.77% 0.21 0.18 0.99 
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Table 3.  The Effect of Offering a Delayed Option and the Effect of Associating the Delay with a Temporal Landmark 
This table reports the results of ordinary least squares regressions where the dependent variable is either the average contribution rate 
of employees during the experimental period of November 2013-June 2014 (Models 1 and 2) or an indicator variable for having 
higher contribution rates in May 2014 than September 2013 (Models 3 and 4). The same regression specifications are used for targeted 
plans as well as for all plans available to employees. All regressions include a constant and all controls are interacted with university.  
Dependent variable Average contribution rates Higher contribution indicator 
Model 1: 
Targeted plans 
Model 2: 
All plans 
Model 3: 
Targeted plans 
Model 4: 
All plans 
Delay indicator -0.139** -0.270*** -0.0109 -0.0136 
(0.0701) (0.0993) (0.00911) (0.00984) 
Framed delay indicator 0.101* 0.113 0.00454 0.00734 
(0.0612) (0.0859) (0.00859) (0.00933) 
Control variables 
university x female Yes Yes Yes Yes 
university x age decile Yes Yes Yes Yes 
university x tenure decile Yes Yes Yes Yes 
university x salary decile Yes Yes Yes Yes 
university x faculty status Yes Yes Yes Yes 
university x birth month Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0885 0.519 0.0596 0.0900 
Observations 8682 8682 8682 8682 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.  The Effects of Different Fresh Start Framings and the Effects of Different Lengths of Standard Delays 
 
This table reports the results of ordinary least squares regressions where the dependent variable is either the average contribution rate 
of employees during the experimental period of November 2013-June 2014 (Models 1 and 2) or an indicator variable for having 
higher contribution rates in May 2014 than September 2013 (Models 3 and 4). The same regression specifications are used for targeted 
plans as well as for all plans available to employees. All regressions include a constant and all controls are interacted with university.  
 
Dependent variable Average contribution rates Higher contribution indicator 
 Model 1: 
Targeted plans 
Model 2: 
All plans 
Model 3: 
Targeted plans 
Model 4: 
All plans 
Birth Month November - March     
     
Delay indicator -0.0982 -0.229 -0.0120 -0.0273 
 (0.124) (0.172) (0.0157) (0.0170) 
     
Holiday-framed delay indicator 0.0358 0.190 0.00479 0.0168 
 (0.0982) (0.148) (0.0155) (0.0169) 
     
Birthday-framed delay indicator 0.220** 0.326** 0.0281* 0.0403** 
 (0.111) (0.160) (0.0161) (0.0174) 
     
Birth Month April - October     
     
2-month delay option available -0.214** -0.463** -0.0206 -0.00925 
 (0.108) (0.185) (0.0208) (0.0227) 
     
3-month delay option available -0.172 -0.395*** -0.00768 0.00425 
 (0.105) (0.152) (0.0159) (0.0173) 
     
4-month delay option available -0.153 -0.160 -0.0219 -0.0230 
 (0.157) (0.241) (0.0202) (0.0221) 
     
5-month delay option available -0.0296 0.106 -0.00104 -0.00681 
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(0.149) (0.223) (0.0213) (0.0231) 
6-month delay option available -0.228* -0.445** -0.00423 -0.00933 
(0.129) (0.173) (0.0203) (0.0219) 
Delay framed as post Thanksgiving 0.140 0.0372 -0.00418 -0.00489 
(0.201) (0.275) (0.0265) (0.0296) 
Delay framed as post New Year's -0.00102 0.00873 -0.0143 -0.0324 
(0.117) (0.171) (0.0192) (0.0208) 
Delay framed as post Martin Luther 
King Day 
-0.0552 -0.248 -0.0186 -0.0115 
(0.168) (0.268) (0.0256) (0.0281) 
Delay framed as post Valentine's Day -0.253 -0.487* -0.00384 0.0125 
(0.159) (0.259) (0.0285) (0.0311) 
Delay framed as post Spring Equinox 0.622** 0.652* 0.0279 0.0241 
(0.313) (0.354) (0.0285) (0.0302) 
Control variables 
university x female Yes Yes Yes Yes 
university x age decile Yes Yes Yes Yes 
university x tenure decile Yes Yes Yes Yes 
university x salary decile Yes Yes Yes Yes 
university x faculty status Yes Yes Yes Yes 
university x birth month Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0903 0.520 0.0609 0.0912 
Observations 8682 8682 8682 8682 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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8,682 Employees Randomized 
 3,555 Employees with Birthdays 
between November and March 
889 Employees Assigned to No Delay 
Condition 
887 Employees Assigned to Standard 
Delay Condition 
886 Employees Assigned to Holiday-
Framed Delay Condition 
893 Employees Assigned to Birthday-
Framed Delay Condition 
5,127 Employees with Birthdays 
between April and October 
1,711 Employees Assigned to No Delay 
Condition 
1,709 Employees Assigned to Standard 
Delay Condition 
1,707 Employees Assigned to Holiday-
Framed Delay Condition 
Figure 1. Study Flow 
  
*Note: 42 randomized employees were not included in this figure and in the analysis because either they did not have data collected, 
were terminated before the baseline data collection, or had conflicting bate of births.  
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Figure 2. The Effects of Different Framings for the Delayed Option (Field Experiment) 
 
Figure 2 shows the predicted average contribution rate (Panels A and B) and the predicted 
likelihood of increasing contribution rates from September 2013 to May 2014 (Panels C and D) 
for an average employee whose birth month is between November and March.  
 
                               Panel A (Targeted Plans)                                         Panel B (All Plans) 
 
                              
                           Panel C (Targeted Plans)                                                    Panel D (All Plans) 
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Figure 3. The Effects of Messaging Strategies on Inferred Recommendation (Laboratory Experiment) 
 
Panels A-C plot participants’ ratings of how strongly the Human Resources Department recommended retirement savings based on 
which messaging strategy was selected. Participants were presented with two messaging strategies. Each panel represents one pair of 
messaging strategies.  
 
 
                              Panel A                                                              Panel B                                                            Panel C 
    
Note. Error bars represent standard errors.   
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Appendix A. Descriptions of Non-Targeted Plans 
School Plan Eligibility Employee Contribution Employer Contribution Automatic 
Sign-Up 
A Plan 1 Employees based upon job 
position and scheduled hours of 
service.  
None - University pays the full cost by 
contributing 10% of the 
employee’s base pay.  
- Base pay limit: $255,000 for 
2013 and $260,000 for 2014 
No 
B Plan 1 
Plan 2 
A  regular or fixed-term employee 
scheduled to work a minimum of 
1,000 hours per fiscal year, who is 
not currently actively 
participating Plan 2 
A regular or fixed-term employee 
hired prior to June 30, 1993, who 
is scheduled to work at least 20 
hours per week for a minimum of 
720 hours per fiscal year 
1% of the employee’s eligible 
gross earnings on a pretax basis 
1% of employee’s eligible gross 
earnings on an after-tax basis  
Matched by a 8% contribution 
from the University 
There are several benefit 
calculation formulas. The Plan 
uses the formula that maximizes 
benefit.  
No 
No 
C Plan 1 
Plan 2 
Benefits eligible faculty and staff 
member of age 21 and older.  
Any employee earning at least 
140% of the Social Security 
Wage Base 
None 
Elected amount of deferral of 
compensation with pre-tax dollars 
- Within  Social Security Wage 
base: 7% (age  < 50) and 10% 
(age ≥ 50) 
- Above Social Security Wage 
base: 12% (age < 50) and 15% 
(age ≥ 50) 
None 
Yes 
No 
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D Plan 1 
Plan 2 
All employees except for student 
workers, hospital employees, 
leased employees, and those in 
post-doctoral positions.        
Employees not covered by the 
targeted plan and who work at 
least 1,000 hours per year 
Elected percentage of employee’s 
pre-tax basis salary.  
None 
None 
Final average pay x Years of Plan 
2 participation x 1.25% (final 
average pay = average of highest 
5 years of  earnings of employee 
out of 10 years of participation in 
the Plan) 
No 
Yes 
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Appendix B. Descriptions of Robustness Checks and Regression Results 
 
A. Our results remain qualitatively unchanged if we drop employees whose total annual 
contributions to all of the non-targeted plans prior to our experiment exceeded the 
IRS limit of $17,500 because those employees would not have been able to save more 
in the targeted plan. Specifically, we multiply employees’ total contribution rates to 
all of non-targeted plans prior to our experiment by their annual salary. For 
employees whose total contribution rate to all non-targeted plans was zero or missing, 
we use their cumulative dollar contributions from January 2013 to September 2013 to 
extrapolate their contributions in the year 2013. Then we drop individuals whose 
2013 dollar contributions to all non-targeted plan was over $17,500 prior to our 
experiment.  
B. Some employees have missing data on salary or contributions. Our results reported in 
the paper assigned a value of zero to missing data. Our results are robust if we drop 
employees who have missing data on salary or contributions.  
C. To calculate an employee’s contribution rate in a given month, we divide her dollar 
contributions by her salary in the same month. Since we construct the higher 
contribution indicator by comparing our imputed contribution rates in May 2014 vs. 
September 2013, we want to ensure that our results are not spuriously driven by how 
we round our imputed contribution rates. For example, if an employee had an 
imputed contribution rate of 5.03% in September 2013 and 5.303% in May 2014, it is 
unlikely that this employee increased her contribution rate by 0.003% but rather this 
reflects an issue of rounding contribution rates. Thus, we have rounded contribution 
rates in multiple ways and obtained similar results. 
D. Our results remain meaningfully unchanged when we use logistic regressions (rather 
than OLS regressions) to predict the higher contribution indicator, though the delayed 
option now only leads to a statistically insignificant decrease in the likelihood of 
increasing contribution rates for all plans between September 2013 and May 2014 
(Model 2 of Panel D).  
 
 
31 
Appendix C. Additional Analysis of Our Laboratory Experiment 
In our laboratory experiment, participants were asked to indicate how they thought “the 
fact that the HR department chose this messaging strategy (rather than the other messaging 
strategy) will affect the total amount of money that employees contribute to the retirement 
savings program (say, over the coming 8 months).” Three options were: (a) their choice will lead 
to lower total contributions to the retirement savings program; (b) their choice will make no 
difference; (c) their choice will lead to higher total contributions to the retirement savings 
program. We first examine responses from participants who were presented with the no delay 
and standard delay mailings. When the standard delay mailing was selected by the HR 
department, 42.27% of participants believed that it would lead to higher total contributions than 
the no delay mailing as the alternative strategy. However, 74.32% of participants believed that 
the no delay mailing as the endorsed strategy would lead to higher total contributions than the 
standard delay mailing as the alternative strategy (two-sample proportion test, p < .0001). Next, 
we compare the standard delay mailing with the make-up delay mailing. When the standard 
delay mailing was endorsed, 40.79% of participants believed that it would lead to higher total 
contributions than the make-up delay mailing as the alternative strategy. However, when the 
make-up delay mailing was endorsed, 62.2% of participants believed that it would result in 
higher total contributions than the standard delay mailing (two-sample proportion test, p = .001). 
Last, we compare the no delay mailing with the make-up delay mailing. When the no delay 
mailing was endorsed, 38.55% of participants believed that it would lead to higher total 
contributions than the make-up delay mailing. However, when the make-up delay mailing was 
endorsed, 77.05% of participants expected it to outperform the no delay mailing (two-sample 
proportion test, p < .0001). As described in the paper, people inferred that the HR department 
recommended retirement savings more strongly if the HR department chose the make-up delay 
mailing than if the HR department chose the no delay mailing, which in turn implied stronger 
recommendation of the HR department than the standard delay mailing. Combining the results in 
the paper with the findings presented in this Appendix, we find that people tend to predict that 
the messaging strategy which signals the HR department’s stronger recommendation would 
result in higher total contributions than the messaging strategy which signals the HR 
department’s weaker recommendation. This is consistent with our speculation that 
recommendation implicit in mailings affects savings. 
